Understanding
Being-For-Itself in Sartre’s Existentialism
By
Jean-Paul KATSHEZ
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. On the Concept of
Existentialism
1.1 General understanding and
philosophical background
Notion of human subjectivity and choice
Ontological Categories: Being and Nothingness
2. 1 Ontological Subcategories
2. 4 Being-For-Itself and the idea of God
I would like
to express my gratitude to Mr. Victor Badibanga Bin Kapela, my moderator and first reader for his understanding
and attention he has proved during my research, to Fr. Jan Elpert,
OFM my second reader, to Fr. Dan Perkaske, SDS the
rector of the Salvatorian Student Community in Morogoro, to Br. Donald Maurer, SDS and to the Salvatorian Staff Community in general. I would like to
extend my gratitude to some friends for their love, encouragement and good
companionship. At risk of omitting some names I would like to mention a few:
Abel Magnus, Alphonse Mav, André Kavul,
André Nkongolo, Anthony Mutale,
Antoine Mutunda, Antoine Wafinia,
Aubin Tshifung, Aureus Mwinuka, Bavon Mumba, Christian Muland, Deogratias Assani, Didier Longwa, Dieudonné Biakuluila, Dieudonné Muthekwa, Dioness Mmavelle, Dominique Amusini, Emmanuel Kangapu,
Emmanuel Kazadi, Emmanuel Pangani,
Emile Musungayi, Eric Mpanga,
Evariste Kabutwe, Francis
Xavier Sauti, George Sanji,
Gerold Mbamba, Henry Mugalu, Jacques Mulombw,
Jean-Louis Maloba, Jean-Pierre Tshihamb,
Joseph Musul, Joseph Muvuma,
Justin Ngoy, Muhongo Ngoy, Narcisse Ngwej, Paul Kayomb, Paulin Basuku, Roger Nyandwe, Thomas Kabika and
Valentino Baloshi Tarimo
for all that you have been and you continue to be for me in my journey toward
truth. Thanks and glory be to God for strength and life.
I dedicate this work to you my parents Sébastien Mulang, Béatrice Kanam and Mamertine Kamin, to you brother Athanase Kasong Kiki, to you all brothers, sisters and relatives, to all Salvatorians throughout the world and to all those who
promote human dignity.
Ce que Dieu
pourrait le plus admirer, et même
aimer assez, c’est l’homme qui ne croit pas en Lui mais qui, de toutes ses forces, souhaiterait qu’il existe.
Jean Rostand
Since the beginning of philosophy man is one of the
concerns of thinkers. Many thinkers from different ages and epochs tried each
in his own way to explain his understanding of man. Some thinkers such as
Aristotle thought that man is a rational animal, an animal endowed with reason.
Such a subject-matter raises some questions: what is
the meaning of existentialism as a philosophical system and in which sense can
Sartre be considered as an existentialist? What is man according to
Sartre’s existentialism and how can he be distinguished from other
beings? To which extent is it possible to affirm that man is the creator of his
nature, his values and culture? Is Sartre’s existentialism the last
answer to the problem of man? These questions constitute the problem this paper
would like to be the answer.
My approach through the course of this paper is mainly
analytical. I am breaking down Sartre’s thought in order to grasp its
components and then to make a kind of personal evaluation. I limit my analysis
to philosophical anthropology ground. A certain amount of books have helped to
reach my goal. Most of them are philosophical books referring to Sartre but the
most basic resources are Sartre’s own books namely Being and Nothingness, Existentialism
and Humanism, and Existentialism and
Human Emotions.
In order to make myself understood I divide this essay
into three main parts. The first one is an outlook on existentialism in general
as a philosophical school and Sartre’s existentialism in particular. The
second part enters the depth of Sartre’s existentialism explaining his
ontological categories and developing the concept of Being-For-Itself. The last
part is a personal assessment. Here, I will sort out Sartre’s positive
and negative impacts concerning the understanding of human existence.
Existentialism is an attitude rather than a philosophical school; it concerns human free existence. A necessary feature of human existence is that men are active and creative whereas things are not. Things are merely what they are, but men have the power to choose and become what they are not yet.
Soren Kierkegaard is thought to
be the for runner of the modern existentialism. His works influenced thinkers
like Edmund Husserl, Karl Jasper, Martin Heidegger
and others. The following generation of thinkers brought existentialism into
the mainstream of contemporary philosophy. The most famous is Jean‑Paul
Sartre who sought to establish man’s absolute freedom and values; this is
why, he defines existentialism as humanism. In its
broad sense, existentialism is “a doctrine that renders human life
possible and which affirms that every truth and every action imply both an
environment and a human subjectivity.”[1] This word has been so
stretched and has taken on so broad meaning that it is frameless. What
complicates the question is that there are two kinds of existentialism. There
are, on the one hand, the Christian existentialism represented by Kierkegaard,
Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, and others; and on the other hand, the atheistic
existentialism represented by Albert Camus, Martin
Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre and others. What they have in
common is simply the view that “existence comes before essence”[2] or, that human
subjectivity is the starting point of history and culture.
Existentialism
is a form of humanism. Its fundamental meaning is that man is all the time
outside himself. He is in dynamism and going beyond himself, that man makes
himself; and, on the other hand, it is by pursuing transcendent aims that he is
able to exist. Since man is self-surpassing, and can grasp objects only in
relation to his self-surpassingness, he is himself
the heart and center of his transcendence. There is no other universe except
the human universe, or the universe of human subjectivity. Then man is not
enclosed in himself but he is always present in universe. Existentialism is
humanism, because it postulates that there is no other legislator, in
the universe than man himself; “man is the future of man”[3],
he must decide for himself; not by turning back upon
himself, but always by seeking, beyond himself, an aim he can realize himself.
Essence derives from Latin
word essentia and is related to the ens (being) and to esse
(to be). “Essence is what is, what exists.”[4] It designates a
concrete, singular reality in the act of existing. It does not modify an
existing substance such as weight, color and operation but “it is that
which exists in itself, that which supports itself in existence without the aid
of a substratum that receives and supports it.”[5] In its root,
existence stands for presence, the affirmation, the appearance of something
under any category, be it in nature or idea. Hence, existence signifies the
fact that something is present in nature or in mind. It asserts reality in act.
Existence includes content and is thereby related to essence. “Existence
is in fact the actualisation of essence, its de facto
placement (existere) in reality since essence was
possible before being actualized.”[6]
From existentialistic point of
view, existence is the fact of being and essence is the purpose or the reason
for being. This means that humans, at least, exist not because a creator had a
purpose in mind for them but they simply come into existence. Unlike objects
and perhaps animals, humans are self-determining and control their own purpose.
They have perfect freedom. In other words, existence is the property of man.
Man is the being, which exists before being anything else. “Man first of
all exists himself, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines
himself afterwards. Man is the only known animal that defines itself through
the act of living.”[7]
Man exists first, and then spends his lifetime choosing his essence. Hence,
existence precedes essence.
If we consider for example,
an article of manufacture such as a book or a paper-knife, we see that it has
been made by an artisan who had a conception of it; and he has paid attention,
equally, to the conception of a paper-knife and to the pre-existing technique
of production which is a part of that conception. Thus, the paper-knife is at
the same time an article producible in a certain manner and one which, on the
other hand, serves a precise purpose, for one cannot suppose that man would
produce a paper-knife without knowing what it will be for. Let us, on the light
of the precedent example say that paper-knife’s essence that is to say,
the sum of the formulae and the qualities, which made its production and its
definition possible, precedes its existence. The presence of such a paper-knife
or book is thus determined before my eyes. We can
apply the same example of paper-knife, when we think of God as the creator, we
are thinking of him, most of the time, as a supernatural artisan. God makes man
according to a procedure and his idea. Thus each individual man is the outcome
of a certain conception, which dwells in the divine mind. “The idea that
essence is prior to existence, something of that idea we still find everywhere,
in Diderot, in Voltaire and even in Kant.”[8]
Moreover, when we consider
the atheistic existentialism, God as creator does not exist; only man does. The
precedence of existence over essence implies that man exists first of all and
then comes to define his essence by giving meaning to his life. Man is nothing.
He is project into the future. He will be what he decides to be. Thus, there is
no human nature, because there is no essence preceding existence. Man is not
simply what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills, and as he
conceives himself after already existing.
The existentialistic common and first principle which states that “man is
nothing else but what he makes of himself”[9] is the basis and starting
point of human subjectivity. An object receives an action; it is defined
by something else acting upon it. Things we make like the paper-cutter
mentioned above are objects because someone makes them and they are defined by
the intention of the maker. Humans are not objects, but subjects. A subject is
a performer of an action; a subject is defined by its own actions, its own
intentions. Thus, subjectivity is ability of humans to determine their own
purpose, or their own essence. Man exists, turns up, appears on the stage, and
only afterwards, defines himself. The result of this view is choice. This means
that we are doomed to choose our own essence, even when we try not to choose we
are in perpetual choice inasmuch as there is no way in which man does not
choose. According to Sartre, humans constantly are trying to put their freedom
on some external set of rules such as religion, science, philosophy, and the
like. We search for an external law that will give us a sense of being right.
Even when we convert to a new religion, take a new law, or even seek advice
from a counselor, we are choosing all of this, knowing what they will urge us
to act. All external validations are just illusions we accept them because they
make us feel better. When Sartre says that man chooses himself, he does not
mean that every one of us must choose himself; rather, in choosing for himself
man chooses for all others. Whenever man exercises his own personal choice, he
sets an example for others. Thus, it is impossible for someone to think that
what is right for him might be wrong for someone else. “To choose to be
this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of what we choose, because
we can never choose evil.”[10]
What we choose is always the best; and nothing can be better for us unless it
is so for all. Our responsibility is extended to mankind as a whole. Being
responsible for myself, I am thus responsible for all men; in fashioning myself
I fashion man.
As the title suggests, the two most basic
ontological categories are Being on
the one hand, and Nothingness on the
other. Being is the widest, most encompassing
ontological category. It applies to absolutely anything and everything that is
actual and
exists, or that has reality of any kind whatsoever. Being is in itself and is
what it is. “Being includes both Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself,
but the latter is the nihilation of the
former.”[11]
Nothingness is contrary to
‘Being’, it is not a kind of being but it is precisely the absence
of being. It characterizes whatever is missing, absent, non-existing. Where
there is nothingness, there is consciousness. However, consciousness is not a
thing, not an entity, not a substance. Sartre calls it a “nonsubstantial absolute.” It is absolute because it
is nonsubstantial.[12] “Nothingness
is the ground of the negation because it conceals the negation within itself,
because it is the negation as being.”[13]
It is always right there with being and cannot be escaped.
Sartre’s ontology possesses some
subcategories denoting a modality of existence. Among them we can mention the most
important one: Being-In-Itself and Being-For-Itself.
It is a form of existence in which something exists
in its own right; in which it is ontologically independent or self-sufficient
and self-contained. Being-In-Itself is just what it is; it is simply the being of objects. Being-In-Itself is inactive, inert, and without knowledge
of itself. A table, a tree, and a rhinoceros are few examples of
Being-In-Itself. Because Being-In-Itself lacks self-consciousness, it
necessarily lacks freedom as well. What makes this type of being be
different from human being is that it cannot become. The Being-In-Itself
already is what it is; it has an essence, it is massive and opaque. A table for
instance is mutable for a specific purpose; it cannot serve a goal other than
what has been assigned naturally as a table because human beings give it a
certain meaning or significance in its relation to consciousness. But
consciousness does not create the table or any other object outside of it. The
object indubitably is or exists and it is what it is. However, it acquires any
meaning standing out from its background as this sort of thing and not another
only in relation to consciousness. Similarly,
It is for
consciousness that the world appears as an intelligible system of distinct and
interrelated things. If we think away all that is due to the activity of
consciousness in making the world appear, we are left with being in itself (l’en-soi, the in-itself), opaque, massive,
undifferentiated… This being in itself, Sartre tells us, is ultimate,
simply there. It is without reason, without cause and without necessity.[14]
In this sense, Being-In-Itself is gratuitous; it is just there without any reason of its being for it “to
exist is simply to be there.”[15]
A Being-For-Itself is simply anything that exists
for itself, that which is aware of itself, conscious of its own existence, or
for whom its own existence can be an issue. The For-Itself is what distinguishes humans
from other forms of life by the fact that it possesses a reflective
consciousness. In
it existence precedes essence; meaning that first man comes into the world, and
then he is responsible to make his own essence. There is no pre-determined
human nature but there is just consciousness, which creates human essence. The For-Itself, unlike the In-Itself, is aware of itself
and the objects around it. It is defined as being in project, that is, it is
not fully. It becomes what it is not. It has potentiality of becoming more than
what it is. It is perpetually designing itself not to be the In-Itself. It is
not its own being in terms of physical mass or shape, but it is nothingness.
This nothingness is the origin of human existence and the origin of freedom expressed
through choices and acts. It is this freedom and not some predetermined essence
or human nature that defines the For-Itself and the person. To put it simply,
the For-Itself is self-awareness, self-reflective consciousness that separates
humans from animals and objects.
Sartre’s understanding
of man as being-For-Itself is that man is a Being whose existence is prior to
his essence and he is consequently endowed with freedom implying
responsibility, consciousness, nothingness, and project. Let us analyse
separately each of these characteristics in order to understand this notion.
This concept of nothingness
is central in Sartre’s philosophy in the sense that it determines the
difference between Being-For-Itself and Being-In-Itself. Sartre identifies
human as Being-For-Itself for man has to achieve himself. But, he calls
material objects Being-In-Itself for they are already made, they cannot become.
Because man is always project, becoming, he is thus characterized by
nothingness. Always he is not yet what he decides to be. His being lays in the
future. Whereas Being-In-Itself, has non-becoming. He is plain. Hence
“man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world.”[16]
In addition, the being by which nothingness comes into the world must be its
own nothingness. “By this we must understand not only that being has a
logical precedence over nothingness but also that it is from being that
nothingness derives concretely its efficacity.”[17]
Nothingness is only possible where there are objects, it is a structure of
consciousness. And consciousness is the activity of nihilation
of the thing questioned and of the questioner; “it is essential that the
questioner have the permanent possibility of dissociating himself from the
causal series.”[18]
This ability to be outside the causal series of nature means that nothingness,
as consciousness, is also freedom.
For many philosophers,
consciousness is equated with the ego or the self. However, Sartre's notion of
consciousness is different from that. It includes both reflection (ego) and
intentionality. Consciousness is impersonal; there is no ego behind it. But
consciousness posits the ego. To explain this, Sartre distinguishes two modes
of consciousness. The first is called the pre-reflective consciousness.
Consciousness here is always conscious of some object. Here is an illustration,
“when I run after the street car, there is no I. There is consciousness
of the street-car-having-to-be-caught.”[19]
When the self is involved in some activity, it does not, at the same time
realize that it is after the street car, but rather it is simply engaged in the
activity. The second mode of consciousness is called the reflective
consciousness. It is in this mode where consciousness realizes the self. This is the everyday kind of awareness I have when I notice facts
concerning myself such as to feel disappointed, to hate cold soup, and so on.
This kind of awareness is straightforwardly intentional involving a conscious
state that has an object distinct from itself. This implies that the ego is not
necessarily the base of consciousness though it can always be posited by it. It
thus becomes one more object in the field of consciousness. And because it is
an object posited by consciousness, it is not self-identical. Paradoxically,
this posited self is and is not the self. Insofar as it is a possible for the
For-Itself it is the self. But because it is an object of consciousness, it is
not consciousness itself. We know the ego, then, in essentially the same way we
know others. But the ego is not to be considered as base of experience. Hence,
it is still left to describe the nature of that consciousness. An important
characteristic of consciousness is its intentionality. Consciousness is always
consciousness of something; it is nothing but an intentional activity. It is
depending on objects, which present themselves to it as complete. Consciousness
is nothingness. “Consciousness is that whereby negation or nihilation is introduced.”[20]
Although consciousness is not inhabited by an ego, consciousness is however
self-conscious. According to Cumming Sartre postulates “consciousness is
consciousness of itself in so far as it is consciousness of an object.”[21]
This relationship of consciousness to itself is not that of knowing but rather
an immediate non-cognitive relation of the self to itself. This is an immediate
mode of self-knowledge occurring in pre-reflective consciousness, which,
according to Sartre is conscious of its objects as well as of itself. In other
words, pre-reflective consciousness is self-consciousness. Contrary to
Being-In-Itself, which is what it is, the For-Itself in the pre-reflective mode
of consciousness is engaged in not being what it is and being what it is not.
Consciousness then, involves indetermination and possibility due to the act of nihilation, which brings nothingness into the world.
The notion of project
according to Sartre finds its meaning in the very fundamental existentialistic
principle: existence precedes essence. Indeed, man first of all exists, then
defines, and creates himself by selecting his own life-goals. His nature is not
predetermined, and he will be what he decides to be. This implies that the
for-itself is what it is not and is not what it is but it must prescribe what
it plans to be. To do this it must be free to project possibilities and by
choosing some possibilities over others it places values on them. Those values
are found in the world but only the For-Itself can create them because it is
endowed with consciousness. In other words, this implies that it is through
human consciousness that value comes into the world. Since the world provides
no automatic meanings unless human being accept some of the assumed meanings
from his culture, man alone is responsible for creating his own life-meaning
out of nothing. Only man can assign value to life-purpose. His authentic
projects are to be his own foundation. And these projects will continue as long
as man affirms them. Human
being becomes more authentic under the condition that he integrates all the
dimensions of his life into one project. His particular projects, aiming at the
realization in the world of particular ends, are united into the global
project. But precisely because they are wholly choice and act, these partial
projects are not determined by the global project. They must themselves be
choices; and a certain margin of contingency, is allowed to each of them. Values are on the other hand,
experienced in the world as a lack. So for Sartre, striving only makes sense
insofar as the For-Itself sees itself as lacking something. Specifically, what
the For-Itself is lacking is an essence. The For-Itself desires to be both free
and have an essence. In this way, Sartre identifies man's ultimate desire as
that to be God. “Sartre sees man as striving after the realization of a
basic project, that of becoming l’en-soi-pour-soi,
or God.”[22]
Man is not already made, he is not the sum of what he is but the totality of what he
is not yet, of what he might be. He makes himself in the sense that what
he becomes depends on himself and on his own choice. His cause is not
predetermined. Being-In-Itself is obviously not free. The For-Itself however,
cannot be determined. It escapes the determination of Being-In-Itself and is
essentially free. Freedom is not a mere property of human nature. It further
belongs to the structure of the conscious being. “I am condemned to be
free. This means that no limits to my freedom can be found except freedom
itself or, if you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free.”[23]
Conscious being is free from objects. We are not free to do anything we want;
however, we are only free to choose how we approach any given situation.
“To be free does not mean to obtain what one has wished but rather by
oneself to determine oneself to wish. In other words success is not important
to freedom.”[24]
Reality such as facticity can restrict man’s freedom. Facticity is simply the situation in which the For-Itself
finds itself free to choose and make man what he is. It comprehends all the
facts about oneself, which cannot be modified, or cannot change one’s
past, age, sex, race, etc. Facticity restricts freedom for the
reason that one is not free to choose not to have been born male, female or
African. However, one is free to approach these facts in any other way by
choosing to become for instance a citizen of another country. The point is that
freedom is restricted by the situation, but not determined by it. The choices
we make depend on the way Being-For-Itself interprets and approaches
situations. Being-For-Itself is radically free to act independently of
determinations. He creates his own nature and value through his free choice.
“In fact we are a freedom which chooses, but we do not choose to be
free.”[25]
Freedom is par excellence the root of human existence. Sartre seeks to
represent every choice as value oriented. But because, values are chosen and
not given, it is impossible to choose in accordance with them. Thus, he finds
no rational argument in favor of one choice over another. Freedom implies some
actions out of free choice and all human life is a choice
[…] in one sense choice is possible but what is not
possible is not to choose. I can always choose, but I ought to know that if I
do not choose, I am still choosing… man is in an organized situation in
which he himself is involved. Through his choice, he involves all mankind, he
cannot avoid making a choice.[26]
The For-Itself becomes aware
of his freedom through anguish. “It is
in anguish that man becomes the consciousness of his freedom.”[27]
Anguish arises when the For-Itself realizes that through freedom it is solely
responsible for its actions and choices. Human freedom is in other words, sine qua non
condition for responsibility to take place through the actualization of choice;
“the being who is said to be free is the one who can realize his
projects.”[28]
Man is not only responsible for himself and his own actions but he is as well
responsible for every other person's actions. When a man commits himself to
anything, he fully realizes that he is not only choosing what he will be, but
he is at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole mankind. This implies
that man cannot escape from complete and profound responsibility. This
recognition of ourselves as wholly free and responsible leads us flee from
anguish. But this fact is essentially impossible because we are condemned to be
free. Any attempt to escape the anguish, which comes with the realization of
freedom and responsibility, is, for Sartre, an instance of bad faith that he
also defines as a lie to oneself.
This concept may
be illustrated by the fact that when I think for example about Bob, I am the
subject and Bob is the object. I can think about him because he is a separate
entity, and I can view him objectively. However, when I come to think about
myself, I become both the subject and the object. Because I am both, I cannot
view myself objectively. I do not have the outside view of myself. This
inability to see myself objectively leads me to rely on others in order to
define who I am. Sartre goes further stating that relations between people are
not fundamentally cognitive.
“My fundamental connection with the other is realised
through knowledge.”[29]
He also provides a series of vivid descriptions designed to bring forward a
fundamental connection between myself and the other, “in which the Other
is manifested in some way other than in the knowledge I have of him”[30],
a connection which is immediate, irreducible, and ultimately emotional, rather
than dispassionately cognitive.
The presence of another person can either be a source of
revelation or that of alienation. The presence of the
other can be source of revelation when Being-For-Itself reveals the
other not as a hell to dominate or to alienate but rather as another
Being-For-Itself with whom to enter
relationship of mutual accomplishment through the recognition of his
freedom. It can be source of alienation when it stops or limits the freedom of
the Being-For-Itself. In this case the Being-For-Itself is alienated. “I
mean that each of us will act as a torturer for the other two…”[31]
The other is experienced as someone who
confronts me, subjects me to scrutiny, and for whom I could become an object of
prurient curiosity. Sartre claims a primitive, given, and inescapable bond between another and myself.
This bond is not that of knowing, but it is a bond of being. “Beyond any knowledge I can have, I am this self which another
knows.”[32]
As this last remark suggests, Sartre provides an account on human existence,
above what it is to be a human
being, in which not only one’s awareness of others, but also one’s
spontaneous response to their awareness are similar constitutive of one’s
very identity as a conscious being. As soon as I become aware that another
person is observing me, I undergo a profound change. When the gaze of another person falls onto
me, I become self-conscious, and I suffer an immediate feeling of shame.
Shame is by nature recognition. “I recognize
that I am as the other sees me.”[33]
With shame I become aware of my body as just another object in the world made
of matter; and that another person can see me in any way he wants insofar as
“he has established me in a new type of being which can support new
qualification.”[34]
The gaze of another thus comprises a threat; it is immediately experienced as
threatening in so far as it objectivizes me. If I respond to this threat by
submitting to it, my response is essentially masochistic; but if I respond by
returning the threat, and by attempting to objectivize
the other, then my response is basically sadistic. Sartre thought that, conflict
is the original meaning of Being-For-Others, and that, “Hell is other
people.”[35]
Sartre's understanding of Being-For-Itself is characterized by unlimited
freedom, consciousness, nothingness, precedence of existence over essence, and
responsibility. He thinks that Being-For-Itself must face the fact of
inexistence of a creator termed here as God. God's existence is incompatible
with human existence and consequently, human freedom. Man is not free as much
as God exists; for, if God exists and is thought as the Supreme Being or
Creator, it implies that He fashioned man, He previously had had an idea of him
before He made him. In addition, if we consider God as Creator, we will fall
under the category according to which essence precedes existence. This could
contradict one of the most fundamental existentialistic principles. Insofar as
man is thought to be free, he does not need any idea of a creator. “God
does not exist if by him we mean an infinite self-conscious Being.”[36]
Either God exists or man exists. And because the experience shows that man
already exists, then the conclusion proceeding from that is clear. Inasmuch as
man is endowed with consciousness and freedom, he alone, can give a sense to
his existence by consciously making himself to be the kind of man he freely
decides to be. In other words, man's happiness and destiny are in his own hand
and do not depend on God "for Sartre declares that the existence of God is
impossible if it is possible for man to be free."[37] He further states that the logical conclusion
must be to deny the existence of such a being for, “the concept of God is
contradictory inasmuch as it tries to unite two mutually exclusive concepts,
that of being in itself (l’en-soi) and that of
the for-itself (le pour-soi).”[38]